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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
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Policy Research Working Paper 5622
Climate change is believed to represent a serious 
challenge to poverty reduction efforts around the globe. 
This paper conducts an up-to-date review of three main 
strands of the literature analyzing the poverty impacts 
of climate change : (i) economy-wide growth models 
incorporating climate change impacts to work out 
consistent scenarios for how climate change might affect 
the path of poverty over the next decades; (ii) studies 
focusing on the poverty impacts of climate change in 
the agricultural sector; and (iii) studies exploring how 
past climate variability impacts poverty. The analysis 
finds that the majority of the estimates of the poverty 
impacts tend to ignore the effect of aggregate economic 
growth on poverty and household welfare. The empirical 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 
Network. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to 
development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at eskoufias@worldbank.org.  
evidence available to date suggests that climate change 
will slow the pace of global poverty reduction, but the 
expected poverty impact will be relatively modest and 
far from reversing the major decline in poverty that is 
expected to occur over the next 40 years as a result of 
continued economic growth. The studies focusing on 
the sector-specific channels of impacts of climate change 
suggest that the estimated impacts of climate change 
on agricultural yields are generally a poor predictor of 
the poverty impacts of climate change at the national 
level due to heterogeneity in the ability of households to 
adapt. It also appears that the impacts of climate change 
are generally regressive, that is, they fall more heavily on 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The continued decline in global poverty during the last 100 years is a remarkable 
achievement, a decline that has been even more significant in the last three decades. In 1981, the 
percentage of the world population living below $1.25 a day was 52 percent. By 2005, that rate 
had more than halved to 25 percent (Chen and Ravallion, 2010). This trend is expected to 
continue especially if developing countries manage to sustain the rapid per capita income 
growth rates they achieved over the last decade. If developing countries do maintain their 
income growth rates, poverty headcounts at the $1 or $2 per day could turn out to be almost 
obsolete as measures of well-being over the next 50 to 100 years.  
At the same time another process has been unfolding over the last century. Scientific 
evidence shows that the global mean surface temperature of the earth has been rapidly rising 
due to increased emission of green house gases (IPCC 2007a). The resulting climate change2 is 
likely to have a negative effect on agricultural productivity, particularly in the tropical regions, 
and to directly impact on poor people’s livelihood assets -including their health, access to water 
and natural resources, homes and infrastructure (World Bank 2010a). There are increasing 
concerns that the change in the patterns of climatic variability is also likely to add to the already 
high vulnerability of poor households, which would exacerbate the incidence, severity and 
persistence of poverty in developing countries. These concerns are rooted in the fact that most 
developing countries are more dependent on agriculture and other climate-sensitive natural 
resources for income and well-being, and that they also lack sufficient financial and technical 
capacities to manage increasing climate risk. In this context, climate change is believed to 
represent a serious challenge to poverty reduction efforts around the globe.  
Given the complexities involved in an analysis of the poverty impacts of climate change, 
different approaches may be helpful in considering these impacts. One way is to use economy-
wide growth models incorporating climate change impacts to work out consistent scenarios for 
how climate change might affect the path of poverty over the next decades. Another approach is 
to learn about sector-specific channels through which longer-term climate change affects 
                                                       
2 According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) climate refers to the statistical description in 
terms of the mean and variability of quantities such as temperature and precipitation over a period of time ranging 
from months to thousands of years.  The norm is 30 years as defined by the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO). Climate is different from weather which refers to atmospheric conditions in a given place at a specific time. 
In general, the studies described in this paper deal with the two different components of climate change. 3 
 
poverty, the size of such impacts, the potential heterogeneity of impacts, and the types of 
policies that may alleviate the adverse impacts. The information generated by this approach is 
useful in tackling poverty today, as well as in preparing for how to adapt to climate change in 
the future. Yet another approach is to explore how current climate variability affects poverty, 
and then examine the impacts of increased variability on future poverty.  
In this paper we review the various studies that have appeared recently with estimates 
of the poverty and distributional impacts of climate change in these complementary directions. 
Given the multidimensional nature of welfare and the myriad of ways in which climate change 
can impact on the different dimensions of household well-being, we limit our discussion to 
monetary measures (i.e. consumption and/or income per capita) especially since these are used 
to calculate poverty rates.  However, it is important to bear in mind, that climate change may 
also have serious effects on health which is also an important dimension of welfare, as well as 
on ecosystem services (apart from agriculture) which are difficult to assign a monetary value. In 
Section 2 we analyze the potential effects of climate change on poverty from an aggregate 
perspective without considering any potential heterogeneity of impacts across the population.  
(The Appendix in the end of the paper contains a detailed description of the methodology and 
the data used to project the impacts of climate change on poverty using the RICE model 
developed by Nordhaus (2010)). In Section 3 we describe papers that analyze the channels 
through which climate change will affect specific sectors of the population based on household 
level data. Finally, key messages from this emerging literature and policy recommendations are 
laid out in Section 4.  
 
2.  CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL POVERTY FROM AN AGGREGATE PERSPECTIVE 
Before reviewing the empirical literature it is worth asking what is involved in making 
predictions about the poverty impacts of climate change using aggregate data. In general, such 
predictions  require  five  pieces  of  information.  To  begin  with,  one  needs  estimates  of  two 
elasticities: (i) the output-climate elasticity; and (ii) the poverty-output elasticity. The output-climate 
elasticity provides an estimate of the percentage change in output due a change in climate based 
on historical data and it is useful for predicting the effect of future climate change on economic 
activity.  The  poverty-output  (or  poverty-growth  elasticity),  also  based  on  historical  data, 
translates percentage changes in output per capita into changes in the poverty rate. In addition 4 
 
to these elasticities, one need to know how climate will change in the future, what the GPD per 
capita (or income) trajectory would be in the absence of climate change, and how population 
will  grow.  In  general,  papers  in  this  section  differ  with  respect  to  how  they estimate  these 
elasticities and the type of information they use about future projections. 
 
2.1 Backward looking approach 
A number of recent studies have opted for a ―backward looking‖ approach to analyze 
the effects of climate change on economic activity, and ultimately on poverty. These studies, 
mimicking the approach emphasized in the growth and development literatures, examine the 
relationship between climate and aggregate economic variables in cross-sections of countries or 
regions. One advantage offered by this approach is that by examining aggregate outcomes 
directly, it is possible to avoid relying on a priori assumptions about which mechanisms to 
include in the climate-economy interactions and how these mechanisms might interact, and 
ultimately influence macroeconomic outcomes. Another advantage derived by the use of 
cross-sectional data is that they yield estimates of the long-relationship between climate and 
aggregate output taking into account historical adaptation.  
One such study is by Dell et al. (2009) who use cross-sectional data from 134 countries to 
examine the effects of temperature on the level of GDP. Their output-climate elasticity estimate, 
based  on  historical  data,  reveals  that  each  additional  degree  Celsius  is  associated  with  a 
statistically significant reduction of 8.9 percentage points of per capita GDP. The authors also 
provide evidence of this elasticity at the sub-national level by considering the temperature-
income relationship using data at the municipal level for twelve countries in the Latin America 
and  Caribbean  region.  Remarkably,  they  find  a  negative  relationship  between  income  and 
temperature  when  looking  within  countries,  and  even  when  looking  within  states  within 
countries.3  However, they make no attempt to either simulate the impacts of the predicted 
temperature increase on income, or estimate its effect on poverty. 
In  a  similar  vein,  Andersen  and  Verner   (2010)  examine  the  relationship  between 
temperature and welfare at the municipality level within five countries in Latin America 
                                                       
3 The within-country cross sectional relationship is substantially weaker than the cross-country correlation, but it 
remains  statistically  significant  and  of  an  economically  important  magnitude,  with  a  1  degree  Celsius  rise  in 
temperature associated with a 1.2-1.9 percent decline in municipal per capita income (not GDP). 5 
 
(Bolivia, Mexico, Brazil, Peru, and Chile).4 The coefficients of temperature (and temperature 
squared) provide an estimate of the long-run relationship between temperature and welfare (i.e. 
the output-climate elasticity) inclusive of adaptation.  The estimated relationships are then used 
to simulate the impact of the climate changes that the IPCC projects for the next 50 years. Their 
poverty analysis is, however, crude. The authors do not attempt to estimate the poverty-output 
elasticity; they simple assume that a negative relationship exists between per capita income and 
poverty. As previously explained,  income per capita and population growth  projections are 
needed in order to be more precise about the number of poor people fifty years from now. 
Because of this, the authors  are careful to warn  that their  simulation results should not be 
interpreted as forecasts but  as simply indicative of the direction and magnitude of the effects 
that might be expected from climate changes. Table 1 below summarizes the estimated impacts 
of increased temperature on the mean level of welfare along with the likely direction of the effects 
of anticipated future climate change on poverty and income inequality.  
A couple of points are worth highlighting. First, the presented estimates (derived from 
the country specific elasticities and climate projections) refer to the percentage change in per 
capita income as a result of climate change relative to a world without it. Second, the direction 
of the poverty impacts due to climate change is derived by assuming a distribution-neutral 
change in the mean level of welfare. Third, as in the case of per capita income changes, the 
increase or decrease in poverty refers to a future situation without and with climate change, and 
not relative to the current situation. Therefore, a prediction that poverty will increase in Brazil 
does not imply that poverty will be higher relative to the present, but that it will be higher 
relative to the no-climate change scenario in 2058. Finally, caution should be  applied when 
looking  at  the  reported  effects  on  poverty  and  inequality  since  they  are  based  on  the 






                                                       
4  In  four  of  the  five  countries  the  dependent  variable  in  the  analysis  is  income  per  capita,  whereas  in  Bolivia 
consumption per capita is used. Four explanatory variables are included in the regression models—temperature, 
rainfall, education, and urbanization rates. 6 
 
Table 1 Summarizing the municipality-level analysis 
  Effect on average 





Bolivia  2.9  Decrease  Decrease 
Brazil  -11.9  Increase  Increase 
Chile  -6.7  Increase  Neutral 
Mexico  0  Neutral  Neutral 
Peru  -2.3  Increase  Neutral 
          Source: Andersen and Verner (2010) 
 
Assunção and Chein Feres (2009) provide an estimate of the poverty impacts of climate 
change based on cross-sectional data at the municipality level in Brazil. They first estimate the 
impact of climate change on agricultural productivity (a proxy for the output-climate elasticity) 
measured as agricultural output per hectare in each municipality. Next, they use IPCC’s 
temperature and rainfall projections for 2030-2049 to build a different climate vector for each 
municipality, which is then used to obtain the percent change in agricultural productivity 
induced by climate change. Their estimates suggest that global warming is expected to decrease 
the agricultural output per hectare in Brazil by 18 percent, with the municipality-specific 
estimates ranging from -40 to +15 percent. 
The link between agricultural productivity and poverty is explored by means of a cross-
sectional regression of the poverty rate at the municipality level against the log of the 
agricultural output per hectare and the log of the total population in the municipality. Using 
instrumental variable methods to account for the correlation between agricultural output and 
the error term of the regression, they estimate that doubling agricultural productivity reduces 
poverty at the municipality-level by 12.8 percentage points. Based on this estimate they predict 
that climate change will increase the poverty rate in rural areas by 3.2 percentage points. 
Considering that the actual poverty rate is 40 percent, the authors claim that the number of poor 
in Brazilian rural areas will increase by 8 percent. The estimates also reveal interesting 
geographical variations in the poverty impacts of climate change. While the North region will 
be the most affected area in absolute terms, with an increase of 6.2 percentage points in the rural 
poverty rate, the Southern region appears to benefit from a reduction of 0.9 percentage points in 
the poverty rate.  7 
 
In order to allow for more adaptation options than those considered by the simple 
Ricardian approach used in the estimation of the impacts of climate change on agricultural 
productivity, the authors consider two alternatives. First, they consider a measure of total 
poverty taking into account all residents in each municipality, i.e. including all urban 
households. This alternative measure of poverty captures the fact that some individuals might 
adapt to the new climate conditions changing sectors or occupations. Second, they build a 
migration-adjusted poverty measure.5 They then compute a poverty measure using this 
adjusted sample for each municipality, for both urban and rural areas. After allowing for labor 
mobility across sectors or across municipalities, the absolute impact in rural areas reduces from 
3.2 percentage points, for the case without labor mobility, to 2 percentage points.   
In sum, these results suggest that climate change is likely to generate heterogeneous 
effects within Brazil with poverty increasing in the already poorer Northeast region and 
decreasing in the already richer Southern region. Moreover, the poverty impacts of climate 
change are likely to be lower depending on the extent to which households are able to adapt by 
migrating across municipalities or switching sectors of employment.  However, the poverty 
estimates of the Assunção and Chein Feres (2009) study tend to overstate the impacts of climate 
change on poverty in Brazil since they do not take into account the potential increase in mean 
per capita income due to economic growth over the next forty years. In other words, they 
consider climate change as it would happen tomorrow, predicting the impact of a warming 
climate on the actual poverty rate and not the prevailing poverty rate by 2050 in a world 
without such a warming. The proper way to present poverty estimates associated with future 
climate change is to project both output and population growth and then use the elasticities to 
predict its impact on poverty.   
 
2.2 Accounting for Future Growth: Evidence from Integrated Assessment Models 
An Integrated Assessment Model (IAM) is a general equilibrium model that relies on 
micro-evidence to quantify various socio-economic dimensions of climate change and then 
aggregate these to produce a net effect on national income. IAMs are utilized extensively in the 
climate change literature to model climate-economy interactions and form the basis of many 
                                                       
5 For each municipality, they consider a sample comprised of the non-migrant households and those who out-migrate 
to other municipalities - migrants from other municipalities are also excluded. 8 
 
policy recommendations regarding greenhouse gas emissions control. The typical output of an 
IAM is the future trajectories of key economic variables including GDP per capita with and 
without climate change, as well as income paths under different policy scenarios.6 
The earliest estimates of the impact of climate change on poverty that we are aware of 
are those by Anderson (2006). Anderson estimates the impacts of climate change on poverty for 
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia based on PAGE 2002 (Policy Analysis Greenhouse Effect).7 
The PAGE model provides estimates of output and growth in the future without and with 
climate change. Under the A2 climate change scenario in which global mean temperature 
increases by 3.9°C by 2100, the cost of climate change in India and South East Asia, and in 
Africa and the Middle East is predicted by PAGE 2002 to be around a 2.5 and 1.9 percent loss in 
GDP, respectively, compared with what could have been achieved in a world without climate 
change.  Anderson converts these output and growth projections into poverty impacts, by using 
regional poverty-output elasticity estimates, population forecasts, and the two assumptions that 
(i) average household income grows at 0.8 times the rate of GDP per capita8 and (ii) the 
distribution of income remains constant. Based on these projections, the author reports that by 
2100 climate change could cause up to an additional 12 million people living on less than $2 a 
day in South Asia and an additional 24 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa.9  
While the poverty predictions are based on highly aggregative and simplified model 
that does not take into account adaptation, the illustrative results suggest that climate change 
will negatively affect poverty. As the Stern Review (Stern 2007) rightly notes, these poverty 
impacts are likely to be smaller if aggregate growth in these countries and regions proceeds 
faster than what is assumed by the IPCC A2 SRES scenario (which assumes, among other 
things, a high population by 2010 (15 billion) and a world GPD growing at 2 percent per year). 
In fact, recent GDP and population growth trends suggest that the A2 scenario’s view has been 
pessimistic, and hence Anderson’s poverty impacts might overestimate the actual impact.    
                                                       
6 For a detailed description of IAMs in the context of climate change control see Kelly and Kolstad (1999). 
7  PAGE is an IAM used extensively by the Stern Review (Stern 2007).  
8  It is a common practice to multiply the growth rate in GDP by 0.8 so as to get an approximation of the growt h rate 
in consumption. This adjustment factor, however, is not explicitly documented in any published paper that we are 
aware of.  
9  The  Stern  Review  reports  Anderson’s  results  based  on  the  95th  percentile  of  the  climate  change  damage 
distribution. Under these higher damages by 2100 climate change could cause up to an additional 46 million poor 
people in South Asia and an additional 98 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa. 9 
 
In order to update Anderson’s estimates to more realistic projections we develop three 
scenarios to model the long-term climate change impacts on poverty using the Regional 
Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) developed by Nordhaus (2010). The first 
scenario (baseline) simulates a world without climate change. The second (business as usual 
[BAU]) reflects the impact of current trends in economic growth and greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) on the climate, and the impact of climate change on the overall economy without any 
emission abatement policies.10 The third (optimal abatement) is based on Nordhaus’s 
calculation of an emission abatement path, with full participation by all countries, which 
maximizes global intertemporal economic welfare.  
We translate the implications of these different growth scenarios for poverty using 
historical estimates of growth-poverty elasticities (see the Appendix for details).11 Table 2 
summarizes the main impacts of climate change on global poverty under these three scenarios. 
In a no climate change baseline, the model projects an annual global real per capita output 
growth rate of 2.2 percent up to 2055.12 This contributes to more than halving the world poverty 
rate at the $2 a day level to 14.1 percent by 2055. Under the RICE model’s BAU scenario with 
climate damage, world gross domestic product (GDP) in 2055 would be 1.5 percent lower than 
in the baseline. In the BAU scenario, the estimated number of poor in 2055 would be modestly 
higher by 10 million, compared to the no climate change scenario, with most of the additional 
poor located in Africa and South Asia. It is worth stressing that this analysis focuses on the 
expected or mean value of the probability distribution of damage from climate change. 
Obviously, looking at lower probability extreme outcomes increases the estimates for GDP 
losses and poverty. Under the optimal abatement scenario, the extra number of people in 
poverty due to global warming in 2055 is projected to be only slightly smaller: 9 million. That is 
                                                       
10 It is useful to benchmark Nordhaus’ business as usual scenario against other IAMs. For example, PAGE estimates 
that the mean loss in world output in 2100 would be 2.9 percent under its high climate change scenario. The RICE 
model presumes a somewhat larger 3.3 percent loss in 2105.  Differences in inferences from various models depend 
more on whether one examines mean impacts of uncertain climate change or the tails of the impact distribution. 
11 Given the limitations in knowledge and large uncertainties surrounding climate change and its impact on economic 
growth, and the impacts of growth on poverty, this analysis (as well as Anderson’s) should be viewed as indicative 
only of the potential consequences of climate change on global poverty. There are profound uncertainties at every 
stage in global warming modeling: uncertainties about future output growth; the pace and direction of technological 
change, particularly for low carbon energy sources; migration patterns; climatic reaction to rising concentrations of 
GHGs; and about the economic and ecological responses to changing climate and how impacts should be discounted. 
12  Projected annual per capita growth rates by RICE are decreasing over time. The annual world output growth also 
masks considerable regional disparities; for example, while China and India are expected to grow at a 3.6 annua l per 
capita rate, the European Union will grow at a 1.8 annual rate. 10 
 
because the effects of abating global emissions of greenhouse gases on aggregate economic 
damages necessarily accrue more to higher-income countries. Unlike adaptation, emissions 
mitigation does not specifically target the poor. The major gains in poverty averted by following 
the optimal abatement strategy would indeed occur on a longer time horizon, by 2100 and 
beyond. 
 
Table 2. Climate change impacts on world poverty (at the $2 a day level) 
  Number of poor (millions)  Headcount poverty rate (%) 
Scenarios  2005  2055  Change  2005  2055  Change 
Baseline  2,069.4  1,259.1  (810.3)  32.3  14.1  (18.2) 
BAU  2,069.4  1,269.2  (800.2)  32.3  14.2  (18.1) 
   Difference from baseline  ..  10.1  10.1  ..  0.12  0.12 
Optimal abatement  2,069.4  1,268.5  (800.9)  32.3  14.2  (18.1) 
   Difference from BAU  ..  (0.7)  (0.7)  ..  (0.01)  (0.01) 
              Source: authors own estimates. 
 
Even though aggregate impacts on poverty seem to be modest by mid-century it does 
not imply that the impacts will be equally distributed among the population. To analyze how 
climate change will affect specific sectors of the population one needs to use household-level 
data and explicitly model the channels through which future warming will affect economic 
activity. 
 
3.  INTRODUCING HETEROGENEITY: MICROECONOMIC APPROACH 
The discussion so far has relied on the evidence emerging from the relationship between 
climate (temperature and precipitation) and growth or the level of GDP in a cross section or a 
panel of countries or municipalities within selected countries.  While informative, these studies 
do not shed any light on the channels through which climate change can impact household 
welfare. For example, climate change may have a negative effect on agricultural productivity 
and also affect poor people’s livelihood through its effects on health, access to water and natural 
resources, and infrastructure. Considering the complexities involved in modeling some of these 
channels, the literature has largely focused on the impacts on agricultural output. This section 11 
 
reviews the quantitative estimates of climate change impacts on poverty through its effects on 
agricultural productivity. 
Over the last few years a large literature has attempted to quantify the impacts of 
climate change on agricultural productivity at the regional as well as at the country level.13 The 
general consensus emerging from this literature is that climate change will negatively affect 
agricultural productivity and yields, and that the impacts will vary across countries as well as 
within countries. To the extent that yield changes are good predictors of the changes in the 
welfare level of rural households, and ultimately of the changes in the poverty rates at least in 
the rural areas, these findings suggest that climate change would have significant effects on 
poverty rates. Yet, it is quite plausible that the impacts of climate change on agricultural yields 
may actually be a rather poor predictor of the poverty impacts of climate change. There is a 
variety of mediating factors that can mitigate the impacts on the level of household welfare, as 
well as the distribution of these impacts across different households. The list of such factors 
includes (among others): the extent of autonomous adaptation by households, such as the 
ability to migrate or switch employment between agricultural and nonagricultural occupations, 
the extent of policy induced adaptation through prices and explicit government programs, such 
as providing access to credit and insurance.14 Also, the distribution of productive endowments 
(irrigated and non-irrigated land, skilled and unskilled labor), and the dual role of rural 
households as consumers and producers of food -and whether they are net consumers or 
producers- will determine how the impacts are distributed among the population. Economic 
growth, often absent in the discussion of future impacts of a warming world, will have a 
tremendous ameliorating effect through the decrease of the food expenditure share on total 





                                                       
13 See Cline (2007) for a synthesis of impacts reported in the literature, and Hertel and Rosch (2010) for a review of 
methodologies. 
14 Autonomous adaptation is typically distinguished from planned adaptation, which refers to policy-based actions 
that are needed when market failures or other coordination problems hinder relevant collective responses to climate 
change.  12 
 
3.1 General Equilibrium Modeling 
The study by Hertel et al. (2010) is an effort to analyze the impacts of climate change 
through a more careful modeling of the channels and the heterogeneity of impacts in the 
context of economic growth.  They use disaggregated data on household economic activity 
(stratified by their primary source of income) within individual countries (15 developing 
countries) and a general equilibrium global trade model (Global Trade Analysis Project or 
GTAP) to explore how changes in agricultural productivity will affect poverty in poor 
countries. Although the extent of heterogeneity allowed by their model is limited, a key feature 
of their model is that allows different type of households to be affected differently by the prices 
of agricultural goods depending on whether they are net producers or net consumers of food.15  
They use three scenarios of climate change on agricultural productivity (low, medium, 
or high productivity) to evaluate the resulting changes by 2030 in: (i) global commodity prices, 
(ii) national economic welfare and (iii) the incidence on the poverty headcount rate (defined as 
the portion of a nation’s population living on less than $1 a day). The poverty consequences 
of a decline in agricultural productivity are evidenced through two channels: changes in earnings 
and changes in the real cost of living at the poverty line. The impact of a food price rise on earnings 
depends on the income sources for a given household group (these earnings shares are 
estimated from household survey data). If earnings rise faster than the cost of living for 
households at the poverty line in a given stratum, then the poverty headcount falls and vice 
versa. The responsiveness of the stratum poverty headcount to a given real income shock is 
determined by the density of the stratum population in the neighborhood of the poverty line, 
and is also estimated from the household survey data. When combined with information about 
the distribution of national poverty across socio-economic strata, the authors are able to 
estimate the change in the national poverty headcount. 
                                                       
15 The authors consider seven types of households based on their primary sources of earnings (i.e., where they earn 
95% of their income): agricultural self-employed (farm income), non-agricultural (non-agricultural self employed 
earnings), urban labor (urban households with wage labor income), rural labor (rural households with wage labor 
income), transfer payment dependent, and two groups of households with non-specialized income sources (urban 
diverse and rural diverse). 13 
 
A number of interesting findings emerge from this modeling effort. First, large 
changes in grain prices do not translate into large changes in the cost of living.16 This is 
because consumers adjust their consumption bundle to account for the new pattern of 
prices and staple grains are only one part of the total consumption bundle. To quote the 
authors: ―while world prices for staple grains rise by an average of more than 30% in the low 
productivity scenario, the average impact on the real cost of living at the poverty line is more modest 
–just 6.3%.‖ Second, the portion of the poverty change driven by the changes in the cost of 
living (the product of the percentage change in the real cost of living at the poverty line and 
the stratum-specific elasticity of poverty with respect to real income) are largest for the 
urban wage labor household stratum. This is because the density around the poverty line in 
the urban wage labor household stratum is relatively high. In contrast, the agriculture-
dependent households show the smallest change.17 Third, in the ―low productivity‖ 
scenario (higher temperature), rising world commodity prices translate into increased 
returns to factors employed in agriculture. Consequently, they report a sharp increase in 
earnings and a drop in the poverty rate for the agricultural self-employed households. On 
the other hand, poverty rises for the non-agricultural specialized households, the returns to 
which fall due to the decline in the relative price of non-agriculture commodities, compared 
to agriculture goods. Under the ―high productivity‖ scenario these results are reversed, 
with no apparent effect on poverty for the medium climate change scenario. Fourth, the 
combined poverty impacts on agricultural self-employed households are positively 
correlated with the size of the productivity shock –with lower global productivity 
generating higher agricultural prices and reduced poverty amongst these households. The 
opposite is true of the non-agricultural self-employed households. The net change in 
national poverty depends on the contribution of each stratum to overall poverty. 
In sum, the overall, and by-stratum, poverty changes across all countries for the low-
productivity climate change scenario illustrate that nearly all countries have some strata 
                                                       
16 Another feature of their model is that all households in each region face the same prices and have the same 
preferences. Therefore the change in the estimated real cost of living at the poverty line is the same across strata for 
any given country. 
17  Differences in impact of cost of living changes on poverty for different types of households are a result of 
differences in poverty elasticities across strata within each country. 14 
 
where poverty is increased and others where poverty is decreased. The notable exceptions 
are most African countries where yield impacts of climate change are severe and no single 
stratum experiences significant poverty reductions. 
The study by Hertel et al (2010) provides a promising approach for studying the impacts 
of climate change taking into account general equilibrium effects between agricultural 
productivity, cost of living, and earnings effects. However, as is the case for most models, there 
are serious trade-offs associated between the tractability of the general equilibrium effects and 
the heterogeneity incorporated into the model.  
 
3.2 Heterogeneity Galore 
The study by Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) applies a flexible framework for 
quantifying the distributional impacts of climate change in rural economies.  In this study 
welfare is measured by consumption per capita and is modeled as being determined by the 
resource endowments of the household, such as land and labor, and the returns from farm and 
non-farm activities.18 Using a comparative statics framework, the impacts of climate change on 
household consumption can be expressed as the impact of changes in temperature on the 
returns to land (used as a summary measure of agricultural productivity) multiplied by the 
proportion of income derived from owned land, the impacts of temperature on the returns to 
labor multiplied by the proportion of income derived from labor, and the impacts of climate 
change on the price of food multiplied by the net consumption ratio, i.e. the value of the net 
marketed surplus of food by the household.19  
Using micro data representative for all India and following the Ricardian approach 
proposed by Mendelsohn et al. (1994) the authors estimate the impacts of climate change in 2040 
on agricultural productivity and wages taking into account adaptation (i.e. using district-level 
cross sectional data) and assuming imperfect mobility of labor.20  They are also able to estimate 
                                                       
18  Additional  heterogeneity  is introduced  into  the  model  by  distinguishing  between  the  type  of  land  owned  by 
households  (irrigated  vs.  non-irrigated)  and  different  types  of  labor  (skilled  and  unskilled).  Each  of  these 
endowments may have different returns and responses to climate.  
19 It should also be noted, that the impacts of climate change are derived based on the current stock and distribution 
of endowments of land and labor. 
20 The effect of climate change on the price of cereals in India is obtained from the ENVISAGE (Environmental Impact 
and Sustainability Applied General Equilibrium), a multi-sector computable general equilibrium model developed at 
the World Bank for assessing  climate change effects and policies. The model predicts that cereal prices will rise 
approximately 10 percent by 2040 due to warming. 15 
 
the impacts of climate change on agricultural productivity in the absence of adaptation using 
panel data at the district level (Deschenes and Greenstone 2007). Combining these estimates of 
the impacts of climate change on the returns to land and labor with the household specific 
information on endowments of land and labor, one is able to derive household-specific impacts 
of the climate change on consumption which is a prerequisite for a proper distributional 
analysis.21   
The main results emerging from the study of Jacoby et al. (2011) are as follows: First, the 
substantial fall in agricultural productivity (17 percent overall inclusive of adaptation) that is 
predicted as a result of warming will translate into a much more modest consumption decline 
(of 6 percent on average) for the majority of households. This is because these households 
derive the bulk of their income from wage employment and (rural) wages are estimated to fall 
by only a third as much as agricultural productivity. The same general pattern is observed in 
the case of no adaptation.22 Second, climate change will have heterogeneous impacts across 
geographical areas and across the income distribution (see Figure 1). Ignoring cereal price 
effects, climate change appears "progressive" insofar as wealthier households suffer 
proportionally greater consumption losses. A household in the top percentile of the per capita 
expenditure distribution would experience nearly a two percentage point greater decline in 
consumption than a household in the bottom percentile. This progressivity is driven by the 
skewed land distribution and the fact that larger landowners are concentrated in the higher 
percentiles. By contrast, temperature-induced wage declines are relatively more costly to the 
poor than to the rich, mainly because the poor tend to engage in climate sensitive agricultural 
employment. Third, once the welfare effects or rising cereal prices are taken into account; 
climate change impacts are regressive, falling more heavily on the poor than the rich. This is 
true in urban areas, where it is assumed that cereal price effects are the only welfare 
consequence of climate change, as well as in rural areas, where the beneficial impact of higher 
prices to agricultural producers offsets the decline in land productivity. 
                                                       
21  Thus, in contrast to the seven types of households considered in Hertel et al. (2010)  in this model there is a 
continuum of households.  
22 The estimates show that in the absence of adaptation a 1 degree Celsius increase in annual temperature reduces 
gross productivity per hectare in the range between 24 and 31 percent, which translate into a much smaller decline in 




Figure 1 Climate change incidence curves for rural population in India 
Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) 
 
While the model employed by Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) is primarily 
equipped for estimating the distributional rather than the poverty impacts of climate change, 
predictions about poverty impacts can be derived with the help of some additional 
assumptions. As discussed above, in estimating the poverty impacts of climate change it is 
important to take into account the growth in the economy over time and the associated decline 
in the share of food in household consumption. Table 3 underscores the importance of this point 
by estimating the poverty rates in 2040 assuming different annual growth rates in the level of 
the average standard of living. Even with a very low growth rate in the level of mean 
consumption (equal to the average growth rates in mean consumption in India between 1951 
and 1990), urban poverty in the presence of climate change is likely to be more than half  (at a 
level of 15.7%) of the poverty rate in urban areas in the base year (32.3%).23 
 
 
                                                       
23 It is important to keep in mind that, in India, the mean level of aggregate household expenditure in the National 
Sample Survey (NSS) accounts for only 60% of the private consumption expenditure from the National Accounts 
(Ravallion, 2003).  Regarding the growth rate in mean consumption in India, it is a common practice to multiply the 
growth rate in GDP by 0.8 so as to get an approximation of the growth rate in consumption (see footnote 7).  17 
 
Table 3 Predicted poverty rates with climate change 







  2004/05  2040  2040  2040  2040 
Rural  48.8  54.8  35.8  18.3  2.1 
Urban  31.1  32.3  15.7  5.8  0.2 
All  44.5  49.4  31  15.3  1.1 
Notes: Annual growth rates in mean consumption derived from several NSS rounds are drawn from 
Datt and Ravallion (2011). Low growth refers to 1958-1991 (0.58 rural and 0.79 urban). Medium growth 
rates to 1991-2006 (1.17 rural and 1.49 urban). High Growth simply doubles the growth rates under the 
medium growth rate scenario (i.e. 2.34 rural and 2.98 urban). 
           Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) 
 
Taking into account average income growth up to 2040, the national poverty rate will 
rise by 3.5 percentage points compared to the counterfactual of zero warming (see Table 4). 
Given the  current population projections, climate change is predicted to result in around 50 
million more poor people than there otherwise would have been in that year.  
 








  2040  2040  2040 
Rural  5.9  4.4  0.7 
Urban  1.1  0.6  0.1 
All  4.8  3.5  0.6 
        Source: Jacoby, Rabassa, and Skoufias (2011) 
 
3.3 The Impacts of Increased Climate Variability on Welfare and Poverty  
Although there is a great deal of uncertainty over the exact magnitudes of the global 
changes in temperature and especially precipitation, it is widely accepted that significant 
deviations of the variability of climate from its historical patterns are likely to occur (IPCC 
2007b). Erratic weather and increased climatic variability will affect agricultural productivity 
which, depending on how effective was the portfolio of ex ante and ex post risk management 18 
 
strategies employed by households in urban and rural areas, may translate into reduced income 
and reduced food availability at the household level. 
Numerous studies have examined the impacts of natural disasters and extreme weather-
related shocks on different dimensions of welfare (see Baez and Mason 2008, and World Bank 
2010b for a thorough review of this literature). In general, they all show that agricultural 
incomes and, thus, food, basic non-food consumption and investments in human capital, health, 
nutrition and productive physical assets are likely to be negatively affected by extreme weather 
events. Many of these studies however, tend to rely on the perceptions of respondents about the 
incidence of different types of shocks or use data on rainfall and temperature as a tool (e.g. as 
instrumental variables) to analyze the effect of shocks to income on other outcomes, such as 
consumption or investments in human capital.24 Hardly any studies use actual weather data to 
analyze the general relationship between weather and the level of welfare. A recent study by 
Skoufias, Vinha, and Conroy (2011) examines whether climatic variability, namely deviations of 
rainfall and temperature from their long run means, have significant impacts on the average 
wellbeing of rural households in Mexico. They report that the timing of the rainfall or 
temperature shock results in a substantial difference in its estimated impact on welfare. For 
example, per capita expenditures are 14 percent higher if the prior agricultural year (October to 
September of next calendar year) was at least one standard deviation drier than the average of 
the last 35 years (1951-1985). However, if the rainfall shock were to be defined within the time 
frame of the wet season (April to September) then neither positive nor negative rainfall shocks 
during that wet season appear to have any significant effect on household per capita 
expenditures.  
In a study building on these insights, Skoufias, Essama-Nssah, and Katayama (2011) use 
data from rural Indonesia and consider two rainfall-related shocks: (i) a delay in the onset of 
monsoon and (ii) a significant shortfall in the amount of rain in the 90-day post-monsoon 
period.  Focusing on households with family farm businesses, they find that rice farm 
households located in areas experiencing low rainfall following the onset of the monsoon are 
negatively affected. A shortfall in the amount of rainfall in the post onset period is associated 
with a 14 percent reduction in the per capita expenditures of rice farmers. Rice farm households 
                                                       
24  There is a large literature on the extent to which short-term weather shocks in poor rural areas can have long-term 
effects on education, health, and nutrition, especially of children. For a recent review of these studies see Baez and 
Mason (2008).  19 
 
manage to protect their food expenditures in the face of weather shocks at the expense of 
nonfood expenditures. The findings regarding the impacts of climatic variability on non-food 
consumption expenditures are consistent with households reducing their expenditures on 
health and education. These types of expenditures may ultimately have a longer-term effect on 
poverty through the reduced investment on the human capital of children.   
The study also sheds light on some potential policy instruments that might moderate the 
welfare impact of climate change.  Access to credit and public works projects in communities 
can help households cope with shocks and thereby play a strong protective role from weather-
related shocks. This is an important consideration for the design and implementation of 
adaptation strategies. 
The preceding studies focus on the impacts of weather-related shocks on the mean level 
of welfare, though not necessarily poverty. The negative effects on welfare suggest that the 
current risk-coping mechanisms have a limited capacity in protecting welfare from erratic 
weather patterns. Considering that coping mechanisms are backward looking in the sense that 
they develop over time based on weather variability observed over very long periods of time, 
there is a concern about the extent to which they can adjust to the changes in climatic variability 
predicted over the next 50 to 90 years. All in all, these observations imply that the change in the 
patterns of climatic variability predicted is likely to reduce the effectiveness of the current 
coping mechanisms even more and thus increase household vulnerability and poverty further. 
Ahmed et al. (2009) is the only study to date making an effort to model the channels and 
estimate the poverty impacts of extreme weather events such as extreme heat, droughts and 
floods.  They employ the GTAP comparative static computable general equilibrium model. The 
model, which is practically identical to that in Hertel et al. (2010) discussed above, is applied to 
16 countries. The main difference is the origin of the shocks to agriculture, which in this paper is 
derived from three different sources: (i) the percent of annual total precipitation due to events 
exceeding the 1961–1990 95th percentile; (ii) the maximum number of consecutive dry days; and 
(iii) the heat wave duration index.  20 
 
They analyze 30-year periods from 1971 to 2000 in the 20th century, and 2071 to 2100 in 
the simulations under the IPCC’s A2 scenario.25  All sixteen countries exhibit substantial 
increases in the occurrence and magnitude of extreme hot events, with the occurrence of the 
present 30-year-maximum event increasing more than 2700% in parts of the northern 
Mediterranean, and the magnitude of the 30-year-maximum event increasing 1000% to more 
than 2250% in much of central Africa. Most countries also display increases in the occurrence 
and magnitude of extreme dry events, with peak changes of greater than 800% and 60% 
(respectively) occurring over Mediterranean Europe. 
The magnitude and spatial heterogeneity of changes in climate volatility suggest that the 
impacts on poverty could also be large and heterogeneous. Among the 16 countries they 
analyze, those with the highest shares of populations entering poverty due to these extreme 
events include Bangladesh, Mexico, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia.  For 
example, in Malawi and Zambia, simulated grains productivity declines of about 75 percent 
cause the poverty headcount to increase by about seven percentage points relative to their total 
populations. There is also tremendous heterogeneity in the poverty vulnerability across 
different segments of the population (differentiated by primary income source). As in Hertel et 
al. (2010) the analysis also reveals that the most vulnerable group is the urban wage-labor 
dependent stratum. While the urban labor group contributes modestly to total poverty in the 
sample of 16 countries analyzed here, it appears to be highly vulnerable to extreme climate 
events (e.g. in Malawi, the poverty rate for this group doubles). Zambia and Mexico also show 
high vulnerability among this group.  The source of vulnerability of the urban poor is their 
extreme exposure to food price increases (with food being a major expenditure, their group’s 
consumption falls with rising prices, pushing them below the poverty threshold of 
consumption). Agricultural households, on the other hand are much less exposed. While they 
are generally hurt by the adverse productivity shock as consumers, they tend to benefit from 
the higher food prices as producers. 
Given that the shares of developing countries populations living in rural areas are 
projected to decrease by more than one third between 2010 and 2050 (United Nations 2009), 
                                                       
25 As previously discussed, the A2 SRES Scenarios might not truthfully represent the expected GDP and population 
growth, and the consequential emissions path. As a result, it is an extreme scenario which overestimates the negative 
impact that climate change will have on poverty reduction efforts. 21 
 
climate extremes may have greater national-scale poverty impacts in the future because of 
higher population concentrations in the more sensitive urban strata.  
The poverty impacts estimated above are based on simple approximations of how 
extreme climate events influence poverty by affecting agricultural productivity and raising 
prices of staple foods. However, it is important to bear in mind that there is an extensive 
literature that documents that the presence of weather variability (in the absence of credit and 
insurance markets) is associated with a set of risk management strategies (ex ante and ex-post) by 
rural households aimed at protecting household welfare. For example, rural households may 
undertake ex-ante income-smoothing strategies and adopt low return - low risk crop and asset 
portfolios (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993).   Households may use their savings (Paxson, 
1992), take loans from the formal financial sector to carry them through the difficult times (Udry 
1994), sell assets (Deaton 1992), or diversify the portfolio of occupations held by the adult 
members of the household (Menon 2009). These actions enable households to spread the effects 
of weather-induced shocks through time. Additional strategies include the management of 
income risk through ex-post adjustments such as sending children to work instead of school in 
order to supplement income (Jacoby and Skoufias 1997), adjustments in labor supply such as 
holding multiple jobs, and engaging in other informal economic activities (Morduch 1995; 
Kochar 1999). As Elbers, Gunning, and Kinsey (2007) demonstrate, these risk management 
strategies themselves are associated with increased poverty, and lower investment and growth 
(i.e. poverty traps).  The reason for this is due to the fact that poor households that are credit 
constrained will choose activities that reduce the variance of their incomes, but that also have 
lower expected incomes than the activities chosen by wealthier (less constrained) households.   
 
4.  KEY MESSAGES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
While the studies surveyed are quite heterogeneous in terms of data (country level vs. 
household level, and cross sectional vs. panel data), methods (partial equilibrium vs. 
computable general equilibrium), and focus (regional vs. country-specific), there are a number 
of messages that can be extracted:  
  Most estimates of the poverty impacts of climate change tend to ignore the effect of aggregate 
economic growth on poverty and household welfare. Thus many of the estimates of the poverty 
impacts provide a very pessimistic, if not unrealistic, scenario. However, it is also important 22 
 
to bear in mind that the extent to which the high growth and the associated large poverty 
reduction rates of the recent past can be sustained in the future depend critically on whether 
high growth rates can be maintained by burning less fossil fuels. 
  Climate change will slow the pace of global poverty reduction, but—based on the mean or 
expected value of climate damages used in mainstream analyses such as Nordhaus’s (2010) 
RICE model or the Stern Review (Stern 2007)—the expected poverty impact will be 
relatively modest and far from reversing the major decline in poverty that is expected to 
occur over the next 40 years as a result of continued economic growth. However, a number 
of qualifications are in order: First, much of the poverty impact is expected to be 
concentrated in Africa and South Asia, both of which would see more substantial increases 
in poverty relative to a baseline without climate change. Second, the occurrence of less 
probable but more extreme climate damage scenarios would naturally result in larger 
poverty increases. Third, aggregate projected damages are relatively low over the time 
horizon analyzed in this note (mid-century). As climate change continues to unfold during 
this and the next century, aggregate damages could be substantial and have a larger effect 
on poverty. 
  The estimated impacts of climate change on agricultural yields are generally a poor predictor of the 
poverty impacts of climate change at the national level. The evidence from the studies that have 
been carried out so far and reviewed here suggest that the decline in agricultural 
productivity resulting from climate change translates in much smaller increases in poverty 
at the national level. This is primarily due to two factors: (i) heterogeneity in how climate 
change impacts on different geographical areas within countries as well as across the 
national income distribution; and (ii) heterogeneity in the ability of households to adapt, i.e. 
moving across space and across sector of employment. It is important to keep in mind that 
the heterogeneity of impacts of climate change across space is not synonymous to 
heterogeneity in the ability of households to adapt (ex-ante or ex-post) to the changes in 
climate.  
  It also appears that the impacts of climate change are generally regressive, i.e. falling more heavily 
on the poor than the rich. The impacts of the higher food prices associated with the global 
increase in temperatures are likely to have different effects on households who are net 
producers of food compared to households who are net consumers of food. Net producers 23 
 
are likely to benefit from higher prices while net consumers are likely to be hurt. Although 
there is a great deal of uncertainty about whether the global decline in agricultural 
productivity is likely to translate to large increases in grain prices, there is some evidence 
that increases in grain prices of the order of 30 percent by 2030 translate into 
considerable smaller changes in the cost of living for those households close to the 
poverty line. The increasing urbanization suggests that the number of net consumers of 
food is likely to increase substantially over the next few decades. This suggests that the 
gradual global warming, as well as the increased incidence of extreme weather resulting 
from climate change, is likely to hurt urban wage labor much more than rural labor 
(self-employed in agriculture). 
Fortunately, many of the policies that can be effective at reducing the impacts of climate change 
on poverty are not different from the strategies of sound development agendas aimed at 
reducing poverty and promoting economic growth. The most important elements of such 
policies include: Smoothing the price impacts of regional or country-specific climate shocks 
through international trade; investing in human capital to increase employment opportunities 
of the poor, accompanied by policies and incentives that facilitate the migration of the poor to 
the areas with better economic opportunities; providing credit and developing insurance 
markets; investing in transportation and communication infrastructure; investing in irrigation 
and/or improved water management to deal with extreme precipitation events; investing in 
adaptive agricultural research and in information and extension services; improving 
governance of common-pool natural resources; and creating well targeted and scalable safety 
nets systems. .  The regressive impacts of climate change alluded to above combined with the 
emerging evidence that access to social protection and credit programs moderate the welfare 
impacts of climate change suggest that the establishment of safety net programs and the 
strengthening of the institutions needed for the implementation and scaling-up of such 
programs should be a critical component of country-level adaptation strategies.  In particular, 
safety net systems that are counter-cyclical, such as conditional and unconditional cash 
transfers, workfare programs (e.g., food or cash-for work), and social funds (community-level 
programs in infrastructure, social services, training, etc.) can have immediate pay-offs  since 
they enable countries to deal with economic crises and other shocks that may not be related to 
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In order to project the impacts of climate change on poverty it is necessary to estimate: 
(i) how climate change is going to impact the welfare measure (i.e. per capita GDP, or per capita 
Private Consumption Expenditure (PCE) from National Account Statistics, or household mean 
income), and (ii) how these changes in welfare measures translate into poverty numbers. 
Focusing on the second relation, a simple and straightforward concept is the poverty-
growth elasticity. This relationship is derived from the fact that any poverty measure, such as 
the headcount ratio, can be expressed (for a given poverty line) as a function of the mean of the 
distribution and the parameters of the Lorenz curve26 
 
      
   
 
 
     
 
where H is the headcount index, z is the poverty line,  is the mean of the distribution, L is the 
Lorenz curve for a given distribution, and  is a vector of parameters associated to L. 




   
   
   
  




   
  
  
       
 
which shows how changes in poverty relate either to economic growth or to changes in the 
Lorenz curve. The first term on the RHS, also known as the growth component, can be 
estimated with a regression of the proportionate changes in poverty on the proportionate 




        
  
 
           
                                                       
26  For further details see Ferreira (2010). APPENDIX  




where  is the poverty-growth elasticity with respect to the mean consumption given by .27 For 
consistency, we replace the household mean income or consumption by the per capita private 
consumption component (PCE) in the estimation of the parameter of interest. This empirical 
decision was made because projections from the RICE model are available only for PCE per 
capita. 
There exist differences between estimating the poverty-growth elasticity based on 
household mean income or per capita PCE. Figure A1.a shows the proportionate changes in the 
poverty rate against the rate of growth of average income. The overall poverty-growth elasticity 
(defined as $2 a day PPP) is -2.02 with a (heteroskedasticity corrected) standard error of 0.82. In 
contrast, Figure A1.b plots the proportionate changes in the same poverty rate against the 
growth rate in PCE per capita. Though similar, the estimated elasticity of -1.44 (standard error 
of 0.60) is not as strong as before.28 It is important to note that these estimations are based on the 
same countries and time spells, in order to make both welfare measures comparable across both 
space and time.29 
 
II. The Data 
The data requirement for this exercise might be divided into two: historical data and 
projections. Historical data are needed to compute the poverty-growth elasticity. For this 
purpose we construct a dataset with the following variables: poverty measure ($2 a day 
headcount ratio), household mean income or expenditure, and per capita PCE. Our dataset 
includes 91 countries; 75 of them have at least two surveys from the early 1990’s until 2000 (last 
year available). Table A1 lists the countries and survey dates used in the simulation.  
Following Ravallion and Chen (1997), we define a ―spell‖ as the maximum distance 
between two surveys for one country within the time range defined above. We restrict the 
sample of countries’ poverty measure and mean income (or expenditure) to those years which 
                                                       
27 This parameter could take any sign and magnitude depending on how the distribution changes with economic 
growth. In other words, the Lorenz curve is not constant over time (see Ravallion and Chen 1997). 
28 These results are similar to those estimated by Ravallion (2001): a  -2.50 growth elasticity of poverty based on 
consumption versus a -1.96 elasticity based on PCE per capita. However, caution must be taken in this comparison 
because these elasticities were computed for $1 a day at 1993 purchasing power parity. 
29 The PCE per capita has other measurement problems: survey periods do not match exactly the periods used in 
National Accounts. At the same time, changes in PCE can arise solely from the non-household sector of the economy 
Ravallion and Chen (1997), Ravallion (2001) and Ravallion (2003). APPENDIX  




were computed over the same measure of living standards and area. In some cases, different 
sub-periods use different measures for a given country; for instance, surveys may switch from 
income to consumption or extend the survey sample from urban to country 
representativeness.30 Given that we are computing poverty-growth elasticities based on PCE we 
complete the dataset with the per capita household expenditure PPP in 2005 constant terms. All 
rates of change are compound annual rates.31  
In order to maintain consistency we grouped countries according to the RICE’s 
classification. For a same reason we estimate the poverty-growth elasticities based on PCE 
instead of mean household income: climate change projections from RICE are available only for 
per capita consumption.  
A second dataset includes per capita consumption projections from 2005 until 2055 by 
10-year intervals based on the 2010 runs of the RICE model (Nordhaus 2010). From this model 
we obtain growth rate trajectories for two scenarios under climate change: business as usual 
(BAU) and optimal abatement. The BAU scenario assumes that no climate-change policies are 
adopted. In contrast, under the optimal scenario those climate-change policies that maximize 
global economic welfare are adopted, with full participation by all nations starting in 2010. 
These two macro projections are net of climate-change damages and abatement costs. In order 
to make these scenarios comparables we create a baseline scenario without climate change 
based on RICE 2010.32 We modify the present investment as a function of the gross present 
output instead of the present output net of abatement and climate change.33  
 
III. Simulation Results 
Figure A2 shows how PCE is affected by climate change according to RICE projections. Every 
scenario presents positive annual growth rates for the rest of the century with a decreasing 
trend. However, the growth gap widens between the no climate change and the optimal or BAU 
scenarios.  Table A2 presents estimations of poverty-growth elasticities for different countries 
                                                       
30 Data was obtained from POVCALNET. 
31 Annualized differences in logs gave similar results (see Ravallion, 1997). 
32 Abatement costs are zero in the baseline scenario. 
33 Rice model assume that saving rates remain constant. APPENDIX  




and regions.34 All coefficients are negative meaning that a higher PCE per capita will translate 
into lower poverty rates. However, some regions respond faster to economic growth than 
others. For instance, with a 2% annual rate of growth and an initial headcount index of 40%; in a 
relatively  inelastic  region  such  as  Africa  (with  a  growth  poverty  elasticity  of  -0.45)  the 
headcount index will fall by less than 1% per year (or 0.35 percentage points in the fir st year). 
The headcount index will be halved in approximately 78 years. By contrast, in a relatively more 
elastic region such as Latin America with an elasticity of -1.35 which triples Africa’s elasticity, it 
will take about 26 years to halve the initial poverty rate. 
Tables A3 and A4 present poverty projections (measured as the number of people living 
below $2 a day poverty line) under BAU and optimal scenarios compared to the no climate 
change scenario for each region/country. In the absence of global warming the world’s 
headcount ratio will fall more than 50 percent during the next fifty years, implying that 1.26 
billion people will remain in poverty. Most of these them will be located in India and Africa. In 
absolute terms, climate change would result in an additional 10 and 9.4 million poor globally by 
mid-century for the BAU and the optimal scenarios respectively. The poverty impacts of climate 
change also show regional disparities, with India and Africa being the most affected.  
Figure A3 shows the additional number of people in the world living in poverty for the 
baseline and optimal scenarios in relation to a world without global warming. Both curves are 
upward sloping throughout the century implying that climate change will have a negative 
impact on poverty. In particular, under the BAU scenario there will be about 10 million more 
people living in poverty by 2055 than otherwise would have been under no climate change. The 
optimal trajectory (based on climate change policies that maximize inter-temporal welfare) 
shows a higher incidence of poverty in the near future as more resources are diverted towards 
                                                       
34 The use of poverty-growth elasticities to estimate climate change impacts has some appealing features but it also 
has several limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting results. Even though other approaches, 
such  as  Bhalla  (2002)  and  Hillebrand  (2008),  take  into  account  distributional  changes,  we  are  assuming  an 
unchanging within-country distribution of per capita income over time. In other words, we are not differentiating 
between growth and redistribution effects on poverty. We adopt this assumption mainly for two reasons. First, most 
empirical evidence found that the poor on average tend to share proportionately in the gains from economic growth 
and this outweighed the impact of changes in the distribution (Datt and Ravallion 1992, Ravallion 2001, Dollar and 
Kraay  2002,  Kraay  2006  and  Ravallion  2007).  Second,  there  is  little  scientific  basis  for  predicting  long-run 
distributional  changes  (Chen  and  Ravallion  2004).  At  the  same,  we  are  assuming  that  the  relationship  between 
growth  and  poverty  (i.e.  the  poverty-growth  elasticity)  for  the  next  fifty  years  will  remain  constant.  These  two 
assumptions are indeed very restrictive, especially as we project poverty impacts for the distant future. APPENDIX  




abatement efforts hence reducing the per capita rate of growth. However, the initial negative 
impact of abatement on poverty is compensated in the future as the optimal policies reduce 
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Figure A1: Changes in poverty headcount ratio ($2 a day poverty line)  
 
a. Mean income annual growth rate (from household survey 2005 PPP) 
 
 
b. Private consumption expenditure per capita (constant 2005 PPP) 
 
Source: Own estimations based on POVCALNET & World Bank (2010) 
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European Union Czech Republic 1993 1996 Income Africa Algeria 1995 n/d Expenditure
Hungary 1998 2004 Expenditure Benin 2003 n/d Expenditure
Poland 1992 2005 Expenditure Botswana 1994 n/d Expenditure
Turkey 1994 2006 Expenditure* Burkina Faso 1994 2003 Expenditure
Slovak Republic 1996 n/d Income Cameroon 1996 2001 Expenditure
Cape Verde 2001 n/d Expenditure
Russia Russian Federation 1993 2007 Expenditure* Central African Republic 2003 n/d Expenditure
Comoros 2004 n/d Expenditure
EurAsia Albania 1997 2005 Expenditure Congo, Rep. 2005 n/d Expenditure
Armenia 1996 2007 Expenditure* Egypt, Arab Rep. 1991 2005 Expenditure
Azerbaijan 1995 2005 Expenditure Ethiopia 1995 2005 Expenditure
Bulgaria 1994 2003 Expenditure Gabon 2005 n/d Expenditure
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2004 2007 Expenditure* Guinea 1991 2003 Expenditure
Belarus 2000 2005 Expenditure Guinea-Bissau 1991 2002 Expenditure
Estonia 1995 2004 Expenditure Kenya 1992 2005 Expenditure
Georgia 1996 2005 Expenditure Lesotho 1993 2003 Expenditure
Croatia 1998 2005 Expenditure Madagascar 1993 2005 Expenditure
Kazakhstan 1996 2003 Expenditure Malawi 1998 2004 Expenditure
Kyrgyz Republic 1993 2004 Expenditure Mali 1994 2006 Expenditure
Lithuania 1996 2004 Expenditure Mauritania 2000 n/d Expenditure
Latvia 1998 2007 Expenditure* Morocco 1991 2007 Expenditure
Moldova, Rep. 1997 2004 Expenditure Mozambique 1997 2003 Expenditure
Macedonia, FYR 1998 2006 Expenditure* Namibia 1993 n/d Income
Romania 1998 2007 Expenditure* Niger 2005 n/d Expenditure
Slovenia 1998 2004 Expenditure Senegal 1991 2005 Expenditure
Tajikistan 1999 2004 Expenditure South Africa 1993 2000 Income
Ukraine 1996 2008 Expenditure* Swaziland 1995 2001 Expenditure
Tanzania 1992 2000 Expenditure
India India-Urban 1994 2005 Expenditure Tunisia 1990 2000 Expenditure
India-Rural 1994 2005 Expenditure Uganda 1992 2005 Expenditure
Zambia 1991 2004 Expenditure
Middle East Iran, Islamic Rep. 1990 2005 Expenditure Latin America Argentina-Urban 1996 2006 Income
Jordan 1992 2006 Expenditure Belize 1995 n/d Income
Bolivia 1991 2007 Income*
China China-Urban 1990 2005 Expenditure Brazil 1990 2007 Income
China-Rural 1990 2005 Expenditure Chile 1990 2006 Income
Colombia 1995 2006 Income
Other Asian Bangladesh 1992 2005 Expenditure Costa Rica 1990 2007 Income*
Cambodia 1994 2007 Expenditure* Dominican Republic* 1992 2006 Income
Lao PDR 2002 n/d Expenditure Ecuador 1994 2007 Income
Malaysia 1992 2004 Income* El Salvador 1995 2007 Income*
Mongolia 2005 n/d Expenditure Guatemala 1998 2006 Income
Pakistan 1991 2005 Expenditure Honduras 1990 2006 Income
Philippines 1991 2006 Expenditure Mexico 1992 2008 Income*
Thailand 1992 2004 Expenditure Nicaragua 1993 2005 Income
Vietnam 1998 2006 Expenditure Panama 1991 2006 Income
Paraguay 1990 2007 Income
Peru 1990 2007 Income
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 n/d Income
Uruguay-Urban 1992 2006 Income
Venezuela, RB 1993 2006 Income
Region Country Survey dates Welfare Indicator Welfare Indicator Survey dates Country Region
(*) Head count 2-a-day and PCE from NA available but not household mean income or expenditure 
Source: POVCALNET  APPENDIX  




Figure A2: Annual growth rates of PCE per capita different scenarios (World) 
 




Table A2: Growth Poverty Elasticity – Regions & Countries 
 
Note: results are weighted based on share of country population over total region population. Estimates were obtained using OLS, regressing the 
annualized change in the headcount ratio (FGT0) between household surveys on the time elapsed between the surveys and the annualized change in 
the PCE of National Accounts (constant 2005 PPP). Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.  





























European Union -2.523 4.167 -0.610 0.606 -20.454 15.408
Eurasia -1.863 0.286 -6.510 0.000 -2.473 -1.253
Middle East -1.060 0.199 -5.320 0.118 -3.593 1.472
Africa  -0.446 0.170 -2.620 0.017 -0.803 -0.090
Latin America -1.348 0.448 -3.010 0.008 -2.294 -0.403
Other Asian -1.142 0.166 -6.880 0.000 -1.548 -0.736
Countries hdc_g
Russia -2.078
China -1.112 0.620 -1.790 0.324 -8.987 6.763
India -0.130 0.019 -6.890 0.092 -0.369 0.110
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Err.
t  P>|t|  [95% Conf.Interval]APPENDIX  





Table A3: Potential impact of climate change on poverty – BAU scenario 




Table A4: Potential impact of climate change on poverty – Optimal scenario 
Number of people living with less than $2 a-day poverty line (millions) 
 
   
Without CC BAU
Region
EU 24.36        0.87              0.93          0.06       
Eurasia 26.98        0.24              0.25          0.01       
Middle East 67.16        19.80            20.37        0.58       
Africa 482.46      342.21          347.94      5.72       
Latin America 95.08        7.49              7.67          0.18       
Other Asian 70.58        23.78            24.33        0.55       
Country
Russia 2.12          0.03              0.03          0.00       
China 473.27      -                -            -         
India 827.40      864.72          867.69      2.98       
Total 2,069.40   1,259.13       1,269.21   10.08
Headcount rate 32.28        14.11            14.23        0.11       






EU 24.36        0.87              0.92          0.06       
Eurasia 26.98        0.24              0.25          0.01       
Middle East 67.16        19.80            20.36        0.57       
Africa 482.46      342.21          347.45      5.24       
Latin America 95.08        7.49              7.66          0.17       
Other Asian 70.58        23.78            24.32        0.54       
Country
Russia 2.12          0.03              0.03          0.00       
China 473.27      -                -            -         
India 827.40      864.72          867.53      2.82       
Total 2,069.40   1,259.13       1,268.54   9.40
Headcount rate 32.28        14.11            14.22        0.11       









Figure A3: Potential impact of climate change on a $2 a-day poverty line (World) 
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